The United Nations' peacekeeping chief sat down with the leaders of eastern DRC's rebel coalition in Goma earlier this month, a meeting that on paper represents exactly the kind of direct engagement a peace process needs and in practice underlines how far that process still has to travel. Among the figures at the table was Joseph Kabila, the former Congolese president who now leads the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation, one of roughly a hundred armed groups competing for territory and mineral access across the mineral-rich east. His presence in that room, rather than in exile or in court, is itself a measure of how much the balance of power in eastern Congo has shifted.
The formal architecture for ending the fighting exists. In August, the Congolese government and the M23-led AFC coalition agreed a roadmap for peace talks in Doha, and a ceasefire monitoring mission has since been deployed to the region to verify compliance on the ground. What that architecture has not produced is implementation. Analysis from the Doha framework's own observers shows only two of its eight protocols have actually been signed into effect, leaving the bulk of the agreement's substance — the parts dealing with territorial control, disarmament and political integration — unresolved months after the roadmap was announced.
The fighting on the ground has not waited for the paperwork to catch up. Data tracked by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project shows drone strikes in the first five months of 2026 alone already exceeded the total recorded across the whole of 2025, a stark escalation in the kind of warfare being used in a conflict that was already displacing civilians at one of the highest rates anywhere in the world. Congolese military officials have accused M23 of deliberately frustrating the peace accords it signed, using the pause in large-scale offensives to consolidate territorial gains rather than withdraw from them.
Layered on top of the military and political crisis is a health emergency that has made the humanitarian picture considerably worse. An Ebola outbreak in the eastern provinces has killed roughly 2,500 people since May, straining a healthcare system already stretched by years of displacement and making the delivery of any ceasefire-monitoring or disarmament programme logistically harder in exactly the areas where it matters most.
None of this amounts to a return to the open warfare of early 2026, when M23's advance seized Goma and Bukavu outright. But a ceasefire that holds on paper while implementation stalls, strikes intensify and a former head of state negotiates as a rebel leader is not the kind of peace process anyone in the region is treating as close to finished. For South Africa, which lost soldiers in the SADC mission deployed against M23 before that force was withdrawn, the stakes in whether Doha eventually produces more than a monitoring mission remain directly felt.