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ICASA wants five SIM cards and your fingerprint; the industry wants twenty and no biometrics

Tech Desk

ICASA's draft amendments, published on 28 October, set out two changes that mobile operators have spent the past fortnight publicly resisting: a cap limiting any individual subscriber to five SIM cards per network operator, and a requirement that SIM activations, swaps, and even existing subscriptions be verified biometrically against Home Affairs records. Both proposals are framed around a legitimate problem — SIM-swap fraud and the use of bulk-registered SIMs for scams and syndicate activity have been persistent headaches for South African consumers and banks alike. Whether the proposed fix is the right one is where the fight now sits.

The industry's counter, organised through the Association of Comms and Technology, is not a rejection of regulation in principle so much as a rejection of these specific numbers. Operators want the cap set at twenty SIMs per person per network rather than five, arguing that a hard limit that low would criminalise entirely legitimate behaviour: small businesses running multiple lines, informal traders who depend on several active numbers to manage different supplier and customer relationships, families managing devices for several members under one person's registration. Set the ceiling too low, the argument goes, and the people most inconvenienced are not the fraud syndicates the rule is meant to stop, but ordinary users and small operators with nothing to hide.

The sharper dispute, though, is jurisdictional rather than numerical. The Association argues that SIM registration properly falls under the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, administered by the Department of Justice, not under ICASA's powers over numbering resources. That is not a minor technicality: if the argument holds, it would mean ICASA is attempting to regulate an area of law it does not actually have the statutory authority to touch, regardless of how reasonable the underlying policy goal might be. Industry lawyers describing this as regulatory overreach are making a constitutional point as much as a commercial one.

ICASA's own draft builds in a long runway before any of this actually bites: the rules, if finalised as published, would only take effect twelve months after finalisation, and a thirty-working-day public comment window is currently open for operators, consumer groups, and anyone else with a stake in the outcome to make their case. That window is where the SIM-cap number and the biometric verification requirement will actually get tested, submission by submission, before ICASA has to decide whether to hold its line or revise the draft in response to the pushback.

What happens next matters well beyond the telecoms sector's own interests. Biometric verification tied to Home Affairs records raises its own set of data protection and access questions, particularly for the millions of South Africans whose relationship with Home Affairs' systems has not always been smooth. A rule built to stop fraud could easily end up creating a new class of people locked out of mobile connectivity entirely if the verification infrastructure behind it does not work as cleanly as the draft regulation assumes it will.